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ARTICLES 
Consumer Protection After the Global Financial 
Crisis 
EDWARD J. BALLEISEN* & MELISSA B. JACOBY** 
Like other major events, the Global Financial Crisis generated a 
large and diffuse body of academic analysis. As part of a broader call 
for operationalizing the study of crises as policy shocks and resulting 
responses, which inevitably derail from elegant theories, we examine 
how regulatory protagonists approached consumer protection after the 
GFC, guided by six elements that should be considered in any policy 
shock context. After reviewing the introduction and philosophy of the 
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, created as part of the 
Dodd–Frank Act of 2010, we consider four examples of how consumer 
protection unfolded in the crises’ aftermath that have received less 
attention. Our case studies investigate a common set of queries. We 
sought to identify the parties who cared sufficiently about a given issue 
to engage with it and try to shape policy, as well as the evolving nature 
of the relevant policy agenda. We also looked for key changes in policy, 
which could be reflected in various forms—whether establishing an 
entirely new regulatory agency, formulating novel enforcement strat-
egies, or deflecting policy reforms. 
The first of our case studies focuses on operations of the Federal 
Trade Commission in the GFC’s aftermath. Although the Dodd–Frank 
Act shifted some obligations toward the CFPB, we find that the FTC con-
tinued to worry about and seek to address fraud against consumers. But 
it tended to focus on shady practices that arose in response to the GFC 
rather than those that facilitated it. Our second case study examines the 
Congressional adoption of a carveout from CFPB authority for auto 
dealers, which resulted from strong lobbying by car companies worried 
about a cratering sales environment, and the aftermath of the policy. 
Here, we observe that this carveout allowed a significant amount of trou-
bling auto lending activity to continue and expand, with potentially sys-
temic consequences. Loan servicer misbehavior, particularly in the form 
of robosigning, is the focus of our third case study. Although Dodd– 
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Frank did not explicitly address robosigning, the new agency it created, 
the CFPB, was able to draw on its broad authority to address this newly 
arising problem. And, because the CFPB had authority over student loan 
servicers, the agency could pivot relatively quickly from the mortgage 
context to the student loan context. Our fourth and final case study is the 
rise and fall of Operation Choke Point, an understandably controversial 
interagency program, convened by the U.S. Department of Justice, 
which, with the GFC fresh in mind, attempted to curtail fraudulent activ-
ities by cutting off access to online payment mechanisms. Here, we see 
an anti-fraud effort that was particularly vulnerable to a change in presi-
dential administration and political climate because its designers had 
invested little effort in building public awareness and support for the 
program. 
The Article concludes with an overall assessment and suggestions 
for other focal points for which our approach would be useful. The exam-
ples span a range of other domestic and global policy contexts.   
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INTRODUCTION 
A full decade has passed since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) triggered a 
flood of foreclosures, crushed real estate and stock market valuations, and 
destroyed a number of leading financial service corporations. Freezing credit 
flows throughout North America and beyond, the GFC prompted a sharp eco-
nomic slowdown, with the unemployment rate in the United States ticking up 
over ten percent. 
Crisis events that generate such substantial economic harms and attendant 
social pain typically prompt wide-ranging policy responses from legislators, 
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regulators, and other governmental officials. The GFC was no exception. In the 
parlance of political science, the GFC represents a “focusing event” or a “policy 
shock,” as described by one of us in a recent volume, along with Lori Bennear, 
Kim Krawiec, and Jonathan Wiener.1 Attracting attention from the press, experts, 
politicians, and voters, a policy shock prompts “policy autopsies,” governmental 
explanations of what went wrong. Official investigations are undertaken by legis-
lative committees, administrative agencies, interagency task forces, and/or inde-
pendent commissions of inquiry, supplemented by the work of nongovernmental 
organizations and academics. Often, such endeavors involve extensive fact- 
finding and pursue careful analysis; always, they bear the mark of prior beliefs 
and political calculations.2 In some cases, policy autopsies lead policymakers to 
adjust their views about the nature of risks and revise their sense of how to bal-
ance conflicting policy goals. In others, decisionmakers perceive the benefits of 
attempts to prevent future reoccurrences to be outweighed by the costs associated 
with proposed reforms. Crises, and the policy autopsies they produce, may also 
generate significant shifts in public opinion and influence stakeholders’ under-
standing of their longer term interests. All such aftershocks contribute to the na-
ture of post-crisis policy responses. 
Few policy responses happen instantaneously. Disentangling the influences on 
the impact of a given policy shock takes some temporal perspective. Legislative 
responses may call for administrative rulemaking to flesh out statutory directives, 
in turn requiring fact-finding, initial policy drafting, public comment, higher level 
review, and then revision and refinement. Although shifts in enforcement prior-
ities may percolate quickly through government agencies, full implementation of 
policy innovations often unfolds over months or years. Complicating matters fur-
ther, new events, including political elections, inevitably reshuffle political and 
policy calculations. 
This Article offers a methodology for studying policy responses following a 
large-scale crisis, whether financial or otherwise. Such efforts should take 
account of the following elements:  
1. the degree of consensus about crisis causes (narrative construction and 
uptake); 
2. the extent to which key institutions come to view the crisis as requiring fun-
damental shifts in policy priorities, either because of the perceived magni-
tude of harms, or adjusted estimations of the probabilities associated with 
prevailing socio-economic risks; 
1. See generally POLICY SHOCK: RECALIBRATING RISK AND REGULATION AFTER OIL SPILLS, 
NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS AND FINANCIAL CRISES (Edward J. Balleisen, Lori S. Bennear, Kimberly D. 
Krawiec & Jonathan B. Wiener eds., 2017) [hereinafter POLICY SHOCK]. To say that crises often 
generate policy responses by no means suggests that policy shifts must, or even typically, occur because 
of crisis events. 
2. See generally Thomas A. Birkland & Megan K. Warnement, Focusing Events, Risk, and 
Regulation, in POLICY SHOCK, supra note 1, at 107–28. 
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3. the degree to which officials can draw on existing policy proposals that plau-
sibly respond to the concerns raised by the crisis;  
4. the degree to which reformers have to grapple with conflicting policy objectives;  
5. the capacity of interest groups to flex their political muscles amid post-crisis 
deliberations; and  
6. when sufficient time has passed, the degree to which reforms are short-lived 
or withstand the test of time. 
In this Article, we apply this methodology to aspects of post-GFC American 
consumer protection policy.3 In addition to fitting our scholarly interests,4 con-
sumer protection was a key post-crisis issue that highlights the competing trade-
offs and dueling social policies that inevitably characterize regulatory responses 
to a shock. 
In the aftermath of the GFC, policymakers identified deceptive and unfair prac-
tices as significant contributors to the eventual instability in the American mort-
gage market and wider financial markets. But extensive reconfiguration of rules 
and more stringent enforcement postures did not uniformly follow. This Article 
explores four case studies of policy responses to the GFC that demonstrate the 
importance of carefully tracing the policy fallout from any large-scale crisis 
event. The wide-ranging policy ramifications of the GFC presented no shortage 
of potential topics to examine. Our analytical framework could be applied to pol-
icy problems across institutions, including the legislative process, agency rule-
making, and adjustments to both enforcement priorities and strategies that draw 
on longstanding laws or discretionary pockets of authority.5 
Our case studies reflect this range of institutional contexts. With respect to 
agencies, it is natural to select some topics that involve the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (CFPB), given its central role in post-GFC consumer protec-
tion. Accordingly, the Article begins with a brief discussion of the CFPB’s crea-
tion through the 2010 Dodd–Frank Act, emphasizing how key elements of 
3. Consumer protection includes efforts to combat fraud and misrepresentation. We refer to 
consumer protection, rather than fraud exclusively, because practices extracting value from consumers, 
rather than providing a square deal, operate on a spectrum that includes situations in which it would be 
difficult to substantiate the traditional tort law elements of fraud, but nonetheless have “tricks and traps” 
elements to them. The term “consumer” signals transactions primarily for personal, family, or household 
use. 
4. See, e.g., EDWARD J. BALLEISEN, FRAUD: AN AMERICAN HISTORY FROM BARNUM TO MADOFF 
(2017); Melissa B. Jacoby, Dodd-Frank, Regulatory Innovation, and the Safety of Consumer Financial 
Products, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 99 (2011) [hereinafter Jacoby, Dodd-Frank];  Melissa B. Jacoby, The 
Legal Infrastructure of Ex Post Consumer Debtor Protections, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 751 (2011); 
Melissa B. Jacoby, The Value(s) of Foreclosure Law Reform, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 511 (2010); Melissa B. 
Jacoby, Home Ownership Risk Beyond a Subprime Crisis: The Role of Delinquency Management, 76 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2261 (2008). 
5. Our analysis does not, however, seek to predict where in this chain of possible intervention 
Congress will choose to allocate authority. For a study of that allocation in securities law, including after 
the GFC, see Usha R. Rodrigues, Dictation and Delegation in Securities Regulation, 92 IND. L.J. 435 
(2017). 
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the new agency’s design reflected widely shared perceptions of institutional 
shortcomings—some longstanding, some sharpened by features of the GFC. 
Because the basic design and early operations of the CFPB have received exten-
sive attention, we focus on less-studied aspects of the CFPB’s scope, along with 
two case studies primarily involving other agencies. 
Dodd–Frank and the birth of the CFPB affected the responsibilities of an 
agency of much longer standing: the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). 
Thus, another of our case studies focuses on a series of FTC enforcement 
campaigns in the form of named “operations,” in response to deception. 
Here, one sees an agency reconfiguring its antifraud priorities, but more with 
respect to deceptive practices related to the widespread economic distress 
triggered by the GFC than to the frauds that contributed to the crisis in the 
first place. 
For our CFPB-related case studies, we focus first on the carveout of automo-
bile dealers from the CFPB’s jurisdiction and second on robosigning as it 
moved from mortgages to student loans. The automobile dealer carveout dem-
onstrates two key themes: the significance of policy trade-offs among compet-
ing post-crisis goals, and the capacity of cohesive and highly-connected 
interest groups to shape post-crisis policymaking. By contrast, our examination 
of robosigning shows how regulators can pivot quickly to apply crisis-related 
lessons to seemingly analogous situations if they are given sufficient running 
room to do so. 
A final case study examines an expansive, economy-wide policy innovation by 
federal agencies outside the glare of either legislative action or formal rulemak-
ing: Operation Choke Point (OCP), an interagency initiative coordinated by the 
United States Department of Justice. OCP aimed to deny fraudulent firms and 
other businesses engaging in illegal activities access to online payment mecha-
nisms, but that ultimately had a farther, and more controversial, reach. One sees 
here an example of a hyper-aggressive expansion of regulatory power, following 
regulatory inaction in the run-up to the GFC. 
Each case study investigates a standard set of queries. We sought to identify 
the parties who cared sufficiently about a given issue to engage with it and try to 
shape policy, as well as the evolving nature of the relevant policy agenda. We also 
looked for key changes in policy, which could be reflected in various forms— 
whether establishing an entirely new regulatory agency, formulating novel 
enforcement strategies, or deflecting policy reforms, as in the example of the auto 
dealer carveout. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I situates the more detailed post-GFC 
policy arenas that we have chosen to examine within the circumstances that led to 
creation of the CFPB. Part II presents our four case studies, contrasting moments 
of more modest post-crisis consumer protection efforts with those that demon-
strated a greater willingness to flex regulatory muscles. Part III discusses the 
implications of our analysis for post-GFC consumer protection regulation and 
identifies directions for additional research. 
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I. THE CREATION OF THE CFPB 
The creation of the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, typically short-
handed as the CFPB, reflected widespread perceptions that failures in the market 
for consumer financial products contributed to the GFC. Congressional architects 
modeled the CFPB on an existing academic proposal principally developed by 
now-Senator Elizabeth Warren, who argued that appropriate regulation of con-
sumer financial products and providers depended on the dedicated focus of a 
new, independent federal agency.6 A single regulatory body, Warren contended, 
would curb financial institutions’ forum shopping of regulators while allowing 
for more effective priority-setting and a holistic, cross-sector approach to con-
sumer financial protection.7 
The CFPB inherited oversight authority over units previously spread between 
seven separate federal agencies, but also received new powers and responsibil-
ities. By deliberate design, the CFPB took a consolidated, instead of a fragmented 
and siloed, approach to consumer protection, making it a primary rather than inci-
dental or residual mission as it was for other agencies before the GFC. The regu-
latory toolbox that Congress allocated to the CFPB was flexible; although the 
enabling legislation offered some specific product or practice prohibitions, it also 
relied on discretionary authority to fight against unfair, deceptive, or abusive 
practices.8 Alongside rulemaking, marketplace monitoring, and articulation of 
best practices for firms and education for consumers, Dodd–Frank authorized the 
CFPB to engage in extensive enforcement efforts independently or together with 
other federal agencies and state attorneys general.9 
9. See Peterson, supra note 6, at 1096, 1106–12 (listing all public law enforcement efforts and 
finding that most enforcement efforts involved collaboration with other law enforcement officers); see 
also Memorandum of Understanding between Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau and the U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice Regarding Fair Lending Coordination (Dec. 6, 2012), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/ 
201212_cfpb_doj-fair-lending-mou.pdf; Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and Justice 
Department Pledge to Work Together to Protect Consumers from Credit Discrimination, CONSUMER 
FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Dec. 6, 2012), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/consumer- 
financial-protection-bureau-and-justice-department-pledge-to-work-together-to-protect-consumers- 
from-credit-discrimination/ [https://perma.cc/Z4BU-WU3S]. 
One of the CFPB’s first tasks 
was to define the specific markets over which it had authority, including 
6. See Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, DEMOCRACY J., Summer 2007, at 16–18. The 
behavioral economics case for the concept is presented in greater detail in Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth 
Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2008). See also Christopher L. Peterson, Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau Law Enforcement: An Empirical Review, 90 TUL. L. REV. 1057, 1060–61 
(2016) (tying CFPB’s creation to Warren’s policy proposal). 
7. See Elizabeth Warren, Redesigning Regulation: A Case Study from the Consumer Credit Market, 
reprinted in GOVERNMENT AND MARKETS: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION 391, 392 (Edward 
J. Balleisen & David A. Moss eds., 2010) (arguing for “a unitary regulatory authority with respect to 
financial products” to address “the fractured oversight” of the current regulatory regime, which allows 
for “financial institutions that do not like the regulations imposed by one agency [to] reincorporate under 
a new charter – and a new regulator”). 
8. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1021 
(b)–(c), 124 Stat. 1376, 1980 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5511 (2012)). 
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consumer credit reporting, the provision of consumer credit, debt collection, pre-
paid credit cards, money transfers, debt collection, and debt relief services.10 
As mentioned above, some distinctive features of the CFPB reflect longstand-
ing critiques leveled at federal regulatory policy, including the weaknesses asso-
ciated with diffused authority and agency designs predicated on multi-headed 
leadership structures.11 Unlike agencies charged with writing many other kinds of 
rules, the CFPB’s rulemaking is not subject to review by the White House Office 
of Information and Regulatory Affairs, although it does face scrutiny under the 
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act.12 
12. See CFPB SBREFA Panels, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://www.sba.gov/category/ 
advocacy-navigation-structure/cfpb-sbrefa-panels [https://perma.cc/5HPB-MN4R] (last visited Feb. 
27, 2019) (noting that under the Act, the CFPB must conduct a Small Business Advocacy Review 
panel). A supermajority of the Financial Stability Oversight Council, also established in Dodd–Frank, 
can set aside a CFPB rule, but only under circumscribed conditions relating to “the safety and 
soundness of the United States banking system” or “the stability of the financial system.” See 12 
U.S.C. § 5513(c)(3)(B). 
To reduce administrative 
bottlenecks and promote forceful decisionmaking on behalf of consumers, 
Congress designed the CFPB on a single-director model, with funding independ-
ent of congressional appropriations, by establishing it within the Federal Reserve 
System but mostly shielding it from the control of the Federal Reserve’s Board of 
Governors.13 These features reflect legislative efforts to prevent regulatory cap-
ture, foster the development of internal expertise, and ensure decisiveness.14 
These design elements also aligned closely with perceptions of the specific 
failings of pre-GFC oversight and enforcement of consumer protection. To the 
advocacy coalition that favored creating the CFPB, including consumer, labor 
union, and civil rights groups and academics, the GFC underscored the shortcom-
ings of fragmented regulatory authority and excessive influence of the financial 
sector. On this theory, an independent agency with a clear and cohesive mission 
was the ideal model to adopt and then enforce sensible standards around such 
issues as loan disclosure requirements, contractual defaults, and avenues for con-
sumer complaints.15 This point of view went hand-in-hand with attempts to “rein-
vigorate[] state consumer protection efforts by rejecting broad preemption 
arguments that regulators like the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency have 
asserted in the past.”16 
10. See Defining Larger Participants in Certain Consumer Financial Product and Service Markets, 
77 Fed. Reg. 9592 (proposed Feb. 17, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1090). 
11. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text. 
13. See § 5491(a). 
14. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional 
Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 72–77 (2010) (describing goals underlying the CFPB’s creation and the 
“compromise” it struck between two competing views). 
15. See Susan Block-Lieb, Accountability and the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, 7 
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 25, 35–43 (2012) (discussing Bureau’s independence and justifications 
thereof). 
16. Jacoby, Dodd-Frank, supra note 4, at 106. 
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II. CASE STUDIES 
The case studies we explore in this Part took place in the shadow of Congress’s 
post-GFC determination, explained in Part I, that the CFPB should be a vigorous, 
independent consumer financial protection watchdog. We begin with the impact 
of that development on the FTC. After almost a century of sole responsibility for 
policing deceptive practices in interstate commerce, the FTC had to share that 
authority with a new agency. We then turn to two significant issues that helped to 
define the CFPB’s regulatory scope: first, a legislative carveout that insulated the 
country’s largest durable goods market—automobiles—from CFPB oversight; 
and second, the CFPB’s willingness to respond robustly to the issues posed by 
robosigning, first in home mortgages—ground zero for the GFC—and then in stu-
dent loans. Our fourth case study examines an interagency enforcement cam-
paign, Operation Choke Point, which pressed the limits of legitimate regulatory 
authority in the hopes of constraining the sort of predatory behavior in online 
commerce that had occurred in the pre-GFC mortgage markets. 
A. FTC’S ANTI-DECEPTION OPERATIONS 
The FTC’s antifraud responses to the GFC mostly involved its basic enforce-
ment powers over deceptive marketing, which it has possessed since its inception 
in 1913. Although much has been made of the FTC’s loss of responsibilities 
under the Dodd–Frank Act, the FTC retained significant authority: monitoring 
interstate advertising and other marketing practices; administrative rulemaking of 
unfair or deceptive marketing in specific industries;17 
17. Congress delegated this power to the FTC in 1975. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, OPERATING 
MANUAL, ch. 7.2.2, https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/ftc-administrative-staff-manuals/ 
ch07rulemaking.pdf. 
and investigating allega-
tions of deceptive marking and bringing enforcement actions, which could lead 
to cease and desist orders, fines, and disgorgement orders.18 
18. A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforcement 
Authority, FED. TRADE COMM’N (July 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement- 
authority [https://perma.cc/RYU3-KDJE]. 
Over the last quarter- 
century, moreover, the FTC has deepened its links with other federal agencies 
and state attorneys general. Since 1997, FTC enforcement staff has compiled con-
sumer fraud-related complaints into a national database available to federal, state, 
and local authorities, known as the Consumer Sentinel Network (CSN).19 
19. See Consumer Sentinel Network, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/ 
consumer-sentinel-network [https://perma.cc/QYJ4-97BK] (last visited Mar. 9, 2019). 
The 
CSN made it possible to identify patterns in the complaint data for use in shaping 
enforcement priorities, often in conjunction with other agencies.20 Beginning in 
the mid-1990s, the FTC has periodically dubbed specific antifraud sweeps as 
“Operations,” each tagged with a code name conveying its subject matter.21 
20. See id. (describing the basic purpose and functionality of the CSN). 
21. See, e.g., infra notes 24–25, 32–34 and accompanying text (providing examples of subject matter 
code names). 
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With this background in mind, we apply our framework to fraud-related opera-
tions of the FTC. Since 2008, the FTC has participated in or led at least seven 
fraud-related campaigns, framed in press releases as responses to the financial cri-
sis.22 
22. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC and Federal, State and Local Law 
Enforcement Partners Announce Nationwide Crackdown Against Abusive Debt Collectors (Nov. 4, 
2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/11/ftc-federal-state-local-law-enforcement- 
partners-announce [https://perma.cc/R2ZC-R3CC]; see also Lesley Fair, Operation Collection Protection 
Puts the Heat on Illegal Debt Collection Tactics, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Nov. 4, 2015, 12:45 PM), https:// 
www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2015/11/operation-collection-protection-puts-heat- 
illegal-debt [https://perma.cc/27Q8-HEZR]. 
Only one, however—Operation Stolen Dreams, spearheaded by the FBI to 
address the fraudulent origination of mortgages—related to events that precipi-
tated the crisis.23 
23. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force Announces Results 
of Broadest Mortgage Fraud Sweep in History (June 17, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ 
financial-fraud-enforcement-task-force-announces-results-broadest-mortgage-fraud-sweep [https:// 
perma.cc/Z6QP-UA36]. 
The other six, explained below, represented efforts to curb 
deception of individuals in financial distress, often due to secondary impacts of 
the GFC, including four campaigns aimed at schemes falsely promising job 
placements or self-employment opportunities.24 
24. Those four campaigns were Operation Short Change (2009), Operation Empty Promises (2011), 
Operation Bottom Dollar (2012), and Operation Lost Opportunity (2012). 
For more on Operation Short Change, see Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Cracks Down on 
Scammers Trying to Take Advantage of the Economic Downturn (July 1, 2009), https://www.ftc.gov/ 
news-events/press-releases/2009/07/ftc-cracks-down-scammers-trying-take-advantage-economic- 
downturn [https://perma.cc/CP66-Y3FW]; see also FTC Goes After Recession Scammers with 
Operation Short Change, CONSUMER REPORTS (July 16, 2009, 9:42 AM), https://www.consumerreports. 
org/cro/news/2009/07/ftc-goes-after-recession-scammers-with-operation-short-change/index.htm 
[https://perma.cc/7HDT-MYKH]; Jennifer Kerr & Associated Press Writer, ‘Operation Short Change’ 
Cracks Down on Scammers, ABC NEWS, http://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=7979894&page=1 
[https://perma.cc/VM6K-Z5QY] (last visited Mar. 8, 2019). 
For more on Operation Empty Promises, see Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Steps Up 
Efforts Against Scams that Target Financially-Strapped Consumers (Mar. 2, 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/ 
news-events/press-releases/2011/03/ftc-steps-efforts-against-scams-target-financially-strapped [https:// 
perma.cc/C8DR-CDUQ]; FTCvideos, Operation Empty Promises: Job and Business Opportunity 
Scams, YOUTUBE (Mar. 2, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rI5Ur9e-FxA&feature=youtu.be 
[https://perma.cc/C6PR-GYGK]. 
For more on Operation Bottom Dollar, see Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Cracks Down on 
Con Artists who Target Jobless Americans (Feb. 17, 2010), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press- 
releases/2010/02/ftc-cracks-down-con-artists-who-target-jobless-americans [https://perma.cc/AB74- 
NVDP]; E4 Health, Bottom Dollar Job Scams, VIMEO (2015), https://vimeo.com/146441935 [https:// 
perma.cc/8W2F-5GYP]. 
For more on Operation Lost Opportunity, see Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Expands Fight 
Against Deceptive Business Opportunity Schemes (Nov. 15, 2012) [hereinafter Press Release, Fed. 
Trade Comm’n, FTC Expands Fight], https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/11/ftc- 
expands-fight-against-deceptive-business-opportunity-schemes [https://perma.cc/B5SF-29H6]. 
The other two focused on offers 
to help distressed homeowners, usually by dangling phony promises to assist in 
foreclosure forbearance negotiations or to refinance mortgages for lower interest 
rates and monthly payments.25 
25. Those two campaigns were Operation Stolen Hope (2009) and Operation Mis-Modification 
(2014). 
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For more on Operation Stolen Hope, see Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Federal and State 
Agencies Target Mortgage Relief Scams (Nov. 24, 2009), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press- 
releases/2009/11/federal-state-agencies-target-mortgage-relief-scams [https://perma.cc/3FFN-SLYU]. 
Operation Mis-Modification was the combined effort of the CFPB, fifteen state attorneys general, and 
other state agencies that resulted in charges against three mortgage relief operations and thirty-two 
similar actions. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Federal and State Agencies Stop Phony 
Mortgage Relief Schemes (July 23, 2014) [hereinafter Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Federal and 
State Agencies Stop], https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/07/federal-state-agencies- 
stop-phony-mortgage-relief-schemes [https://perma.cc/QYH9-9T7F]. 
Two of these enforcement campaigns related specifically to FTC rulemaking. 
Operation Lost Opportunity sought to give practical effect to a 2011 update to the 
FTC’s Business Opportunity Rule, which mandated a one-page disclosure a full 
week before the signing of any contract related to a self-employment scheme.26 
Operation Mis-Modification aimed to enforce an entirely new 2011 FTC regula-
tion, the Mortgage Assistance Relief Services (MARS) Rule, which more sharply 
defined the responsibilities of mortgage brokers, real estate agencies, and other 
firms when they offered “help” to heavily-indebted homeowners.27 
27. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Federal and State Agencies Stop, supra note 25. Under 
the MARS Rule, covered businesses are prohibited from charging advanced fees, advising clients to 
cease communication with their lenders, and making misleading claims in marketing or advice tailored 
to individuals. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE MORTGAGE ASSISTANCE RELIEF SERVICES RULE: A 
COMPLIANCE GUIDE FOR BUSINESS (2011), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/ 
bus76-mortgage-assistance-relief-services-rule.pdf. In addition, covered businesses are required to 
make certain disclosures, including a clear indication of all fees, a declaration that they are not 
connected to any government program, a comparison of the full financial implications of any proposed 
new loan as compared to current mortgage obligations, a specification of the consequences of a failure to 
make monthly mortgage payments, and a note that clients have the capacity to walk away. See id. 
Finally, businesses must also keep records of advertising and client communications. See id. 
The mix of institutional participants varied across the seven enforcement oper-
ations. Almost all involved the U.S. Post Office Inspection Service, which had 
developed expertise in fraud investigations in previous decades.28 U.S. Depart- 
ment of Justice prosecutors and state attorneys general were also frequent part-
ners. One campaign, Operation Mis-Modification, was undertaken in conjunction 
with the new CFPB.29 In most instances, to complement administrative enforce-
ment proceedings and criminal prosecutions, the FTC developed new public edu-
cation campaigns, increasingly through social media channels and online 
resources.30 
30. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Chairman Issues Commissions 2011 Annual Report 
(Apr. 1, 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2011/04/ftc-chairman-issues-commissions- 
2011-annual-report [https://perma.cc/5J6R-BMU4] (describing FTC education efforts, including on social 
media and other Internet platforms). 
Evaluating the full set of consequences of these antifraud efforts would require 
assessing the deterrent effects of enforcement and the degree to which consumers 
have learned important lessons from educational campaigns, each of which pres-
ent significant evidentiary challenges. The vast majority of news coverage related 
to FTC anti-consumer fraud undertakings simply summarizes information 
26. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Expands Fight, supra note 24. 
28. See BALLEISEN, supra note 4, at 271–75. 
29. See supra note 25. 
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provided in FTC news releases—in some instances, only one news release 
occurred for a given sweep—rather than in-depth journalistic reporting. As such, 
it is not obvious whether a given campaign reflected strategic deployment of 
scarce investigative and prosecutorial resources, or a summing up of enforcement 
actions that had a similar character. 
As noted, almost all of the FTC’s post-GFC operations focused on secondary 
impacts of the financial crisis. The collapse in home values and steep rise in 
unemployment and underemployment expanded the number of individuals vul-
nerable to classic advance-fee scams promising loan relief, business opportuni-
ties, or employment. The FTC’s enforcement campaigns, as well as its forays into 
rulemaking, were triggered by increased consumer complaints resulting from the 
post-crisis climate for profiting from socio-economic distress.31 Since 2014, the 
FTC’s enforcement priorities have shifted in line with dominant consumer com-
plaints, targeting duplicitous marketing of automobile loans,32 
32. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC, Multiple Law Enforcement Partners 
Announce Crackdown on Deception, Fraud in Auto Sales, Financing and Leasing (Mar. 26, 2015), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/03/ftc-multiple-law-enforcement-partners- 
announce-crackdown [https://perma.cc/82XS-UDCW] (providing an example of FTC enforcement of 
Operation Ruse Control (2015)); see also Lesley Fair, Operation Ruse Control: 6 Tips If Cars Are Up 
Your Alley, FED. TRADE COMM’N: BUS. BLOG (Mar. 26, 2015, 11:00 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news- 
events/blogs/business-blog/2015/03/operation-ruse-control-6-tips-if-cars-are-your-alley [https://perma. 
cc/24UF-2XTK] (same); Jim Henry, FTC “Operation Ruse Control” Strikes Again at Fine Print in Auto 
Ads, FORBES (June 30, 2015, 10:19 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jimhenry/2015/06/30/ftc- 
operation-ruse-control-strikes-again-at-fine-print-in-auto-ads/#1468dbe516f4 [https://perma.cc/B3A3- 
9WLM] (same); Colleen Tressler, Operation Ruse Control, FED. TRADE COMM’N: CONSUMER INFO. 




33. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC, State Law Enforcement Partners Announce 
Nationwide Crackdown on Student Loan Debt Relief Scams (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news- 
events/press-releases/2017/10/ftc-state-law-enforcement-partners-announce-nationwide-crackdown, 
[https://perma.cc/S5JG-6KAJ] (describing an example of FTC enforcement of Operation Game of 
Loans (2017)); see also Ari Lazarus, Got Student Loan Debt? Don’t Be Scammed, FED. TRADE COMM’N: 
CONSUMER INFO. (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2017/10/got-student-loan-debt- 
dont-be-scammed [https://perma.cc/B7FS-VKKH] (same). 
and computer security protection services.34 
34. See, e.g., Lesley Fair, Operation Tech Trap Targets Tech Support Scams – and Offers Insights for 
Business, FED. TRADE COMM’N: BUS. BLOG (May 12, 2017, 12:43 PM), https://www.ftc.gov/news- 
events/blogs/business-blog/2017/05/operation-tech-trap-targets-tech-support-scams-offers [https:// 
perma.cc/W3GR-JB24] (exemplifying FTC enforcement of Operation Tech Trap (2017)). 
The shock of the GFC, then, redirected FTC actions without significant expan-
sion of statutory authority. The FTC took on a more aggressive enforcement pos-
ture, while deepening its long-developing engagement with companion antifraud 
agencies at the federal, state, and local levels. At the same time, its antifraud 
efforts, as reflected in enforcement operations, were overall less proactive and 
more reactive than those of the new, post-GFC consumer watchdog in 
31. Indeed, one FTC Commissioner explicitly connected the agency’s increased “consumer 
protection efforts” to “fall-out from the financial crisis,” while another described herself as “particularly 
interested in ensuring that the Commission addresses scams designed to take advantage of consumers’ 
economic insecurity.” FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE FTC IN 2010, at 8, 27 (2010). 
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Washington, D.C.—the CFPB. Although the FTC characterized its efforts as 
prompted by the GFC, the agency consistently stressed the need to respond to the 
socioeconomic harms unleashed by that event, not an imperative to act based on 
an analysis of what caused it. 
B. AUTOMOBILE DEALER CARVEOUT 
The first of our two case studies involving the CFPB considers a post-GFC reg-
ulatory path not taken in legislative politics. As Part I suggested, Congress 
designed the CFPB in accordance with a distinctive vision of maximizing con-
sumer protection while minimizing regulatory capture and other roadblocks expe-
rienced by other agencies. However, there is a significant gap in the CFPB’s 
authority: it “may not exercise any rulemaking, supervisory, enforcement or any 
other authority” over automobile dealers that are “predominantly engaged in the 
sale and servicing of motor vehicles, the leasing and servicing of motor vehicles, 
or both.”35 This carveout thus insulates car dealers from the reach of the federal 
agency created to address practices found in a variety of consumer loan contexts, 
including the credit sale of automobiles.36 
36. In 2013, the CFPB issued a guidance document explaining how it would address discrimination 
against non-dealer lenders that acquire the loans. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB BULL. NO. 
2013-02, INDIRECT AUTO LENDING AND COMPLIANCE WITH THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT 
(2013); see Press Release, CFPB to Hold Auto Lenders Accountable for Illegal Discriminatory Markup 
(Mar. 21, 2013), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection- 
bureau-to-hold-auto-lenders-accountable-for-illegal-discriminatory-markup/ [https://perma.cc/R822- 
295A]. But see S.J. Res. 57, 115th Cong. (2018) (invalidating CFPB’s 2013 indirect lending guidance 
under Congressional Review Act). 
The carveout might not be significant if car dealers had little to do with the fi-
nancing of purchases. Dealers often originate the loans to buy the cars they are 
selling, however.37 
37. See DELVIN DAVIS, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, NON-NEGOTIABLE: NEGOTIATION DOESN’T 
HELP AFRICAN-AMERICANS AND LATINOS ON DEALER-FINANCED CAR LOANS 9 (2014), http://www. 
responsiblelending.org/other-consumer-loans/auto-financing/research-analysis/CRL-Auto-Non-Neg- 
Report.pdf (relaying that approximately fifty-six percent of car buyers who use financing to buy a car 
execute a retail financing contract with a car dealer); see also Arthur Delaney & Ryan Grim, How 
Congress Gave Auto Dealers a Pass, HUFFINGTON POST (July 23, 2014, 2:15 PM), https://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/23/car-sales-subprime_n_5614047.html [https://perma.cc/S2UP-2K82] 
(quoting observation of lawyer for Center for Responsible Lending that lenders and dealers are 
“inextricably linked in the auto finance world”). 
Even when car dealers sell loans to third-party financial insti-
tutions shortly after origination, financing is the most profitable attribute of the 
car dealership business, more so than sales of cars, parts, or service.38 Although 
35. Dodd–Frank Act § 1029(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5519(a) (2012); Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, 
Reforming Regulation in the Markets for Home Loans, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 681, 704–05 (2011). The 
carveout itself contains a carveout for dealers that routinely engage in “buy here, pay here” financing. 
See 12 U.S.C. § 5519(b)(2)(B). “Buy Here, Pay Here” dealers, which offer older used cars to subprime 
borrowers, “typically make, hold, and service all of the loans they finance in-house.” On Predatory 
Practices in Subprime Auto Lending: Hearing Before the N.Y. S. Banks Comm., 2015 Leg., 201st Sess. 
6 (N.Y. 2015) [hereinafter Stifler Testimony] (statement of Lisa Stifler, Policy Counsel, Center for 
Responsible Lending) (emphasis added). 
38. See Christopher Kukla, Exec. Vice President, Ctr. for Responsible Lending, Overview: Emerging 
Issues and Trends in Auto Lending, Presentation at the 27th Annual Festival of Legal Learning 
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Sponsored by UNC School of Law 4–5 (Feb. 11, 2017) (on file with author) (citing 2015 data from the 
National Automobile Dealers Association indicating that “41.9% of dealership gross profit came from 
[finance and insurance]”). Dealers are also central to the “yoyo sale,” described by the FTC as “using 
deception or other unlawful pressure tactics to coerce consumers who have signed contracts and driven 
off the dealership lots into accepting a different deal,” such as a higher interest rate on financing. Press 
Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Charges Los Angeles-Based Sage Auto Group with Using Deceptive 
and Unfair Sales and Financing Tactics (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press- 
releases/2016/09/ftc-charges-los-angeles-based-sage-auto-group-using-deceptive [https://perma.cc/ 
7GWV-5P6P]. 
not representative of all auto dealers in the United States, common forms of 
deception practiced by less reputable dealers include interest rate mark-ups and 
“loan packing.”39 The exclusion of dealers from the CFPB’s jurisdiction thus con-
stitutes more of a regulatory crater than a modest carveout.40 
40. The FTC retains some authority over the practices of car dealers. See Press Release, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, FTC Announces Sweep Against 10 Auto Dealers (Jan. 9, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news- 
events/press-releases/2014/01/ftc-announces-sweep-against-10-auto-dealers [https://perma.cc/498R- 
SZ6P] (detailing “Operation Steer Clear,” FTC’s latest sweep against ten auto dealers and settlements 
with dealerships in California, Georgia, Illinois, North Carolina, Michigan, and Texas); see also FTC 
Approves Final Consent Orders Involving Auto Dealers’ Deceptive Ads, N.C. CONSUMERS COUNCIL 
(May 6, 2014), https://www.ncconsumer.org/news-articles/ftc-approves-final-consent-orders-involving- 
auto-dealers-deceptive-ads.html [https://perma.cc/EZU7-5ZWA] (same); Soldiers as Consumers: 
Predatory and Unfair Business Practices Harming the Military Community: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 113th Cong. 35–41 (2013) (statement of Charles A. Harwood, 
Deputy Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission) (reporting various efforts 
to protect service members from auto-dealer practices targeting them). In addition, in 2015, the DOJ 
announced the settlement of its “first-ever” discrimination lawsuit against a “Buy Here, Pay Here” 
dealership after the dispute survived a motion to dismiss. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. 
Justice Department and North Carolina Attorney General Reach Settlement to Resolve Allegations of 
Auto Lending Discrimination by “Buy Here, Pay Here” Used-Car Dealerships (Feb. 10, 2015), https:// 
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-justice-department-and-north-carolina-attorney-general-reach-settlement- 
resolve [https://perma.cc/F2KW-4WQY]. 
How did this exclusion find its way into the Dodd–Frank Act? The legislative 
maneuver was led by Representative John Campbell (owner of car dealerships 
prior to joining Congress) who proposed an amendment to the House bill in the 
House Financial Services Committee.41 Once it became clear that the amendment 
would pass, some committee members quickly sought to switch their votes to 
support the carveout.42 
42. See House Fin. Servs. Comm., Financial Services Legislation Markup, C-SPAN, at 40:10–41:15 
(Oct. 22, 2009), https://www.c-span.org/video/?289596-1/financial-services-legislation-markup&start= 
2413 [https://perma.cc/3QE4-JZEK?type=image]. 
Congressman Mel Watt later proposed, but then  
39. Consumer Protection in the Used and Subprime Car Market: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. 
on Commerce, Trade & Consumer Protection, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of John W. Van Alst, Staff 
Att’y, National Consumer Law Center). Loan packing involves the addition of warranties, upgrades, and 
the like, often bundled and marketed in terms of overall monthly payments rather than their impact on 
the cost of the car. See Stifler Testimony, supra note 35, at 5. According to data from the Center for 
Responsible Lending, African-American car buyers are disproportionately likely to have packed loans. 
See Kukla, supra note 38, at 9. 
41. See Delaney & Grim, supra note 37. There is no amendment number because this exemption was 
added with the initial passing of the Act in committee. 
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withdrew, an amendment to limit the exemption.43 
43. See 155 CONG. REC. 31,364–65 (2009) (statement of Rep. Watt). Under this amendment, the 
dealer exemption would not have applied to:  
(A) any motor vehicle dealer to the extent that such motor vehicle dealer engages in any financial 
activity other than extending credit or leasing exclusively for the purpose of enabling a con-
sumer to purchase, lease, rent, repair, refurbish, maintain, or service a motor vehicle from that 
motor vehicle dealer; or  
(B) any credit transaction involving a person who operates a line of business that involves the 
extension of retail credit or retail leases involving motor vehicles, and in which—  
(i) the extension of retail credit or retail leases is provided directly to consumers; and  
(ii) the contracts governing such extensions of retail credit or retail leases are not assigned to a 
third party finance or leasing source, except on a de minimis basis.  
Id. For competing theories about the rationale for Watt’s withdrawal, see Susan Crabtree & Bob 
Cusack, Office of Congressional Ethics Focuses on Auto Amendment Offered by Rep. Watt, HILL (June 
16, 2010, 12:41 AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/house/103449-ethics-office-focuses-on-watts- 
auto-amendment [https://perma.cc/H4QZ-9P26]. 
The bill containing the carve-
out passed in the House on December 11, 2009.44 
Senator Chris Dodd introduced a companion bill in April 2010.45 It passed in 
May.46 That bill did not contain the auto dealer carveout, creating the need to 
resolve the matter in conference committee. Without much discussion, the Senate 
voted in favor of submitting an instruction to senators on the conference commit-
tee to accept the House bill’s car-dealer carveout.47 
47. The vote was 60–30. 156 CONG. REC. S4138 (daily ed. May 24, 2010); see Letter from Sante 
Esposito & Michael Esposito, Fed. Advocates, Inc., to Mike Linn & Keith Whann, Nat’l Indep. Auto 
Dealers Ass’n (May 28, 2010), http://www.niada.com/PDFs/Information/Legislative/FederalAdvocate 
Reports/2010/May2010.pdf. 
The exception thus made it 
into the legislation that President Obama signed in July 2010. 
Two associations of automobile dealers took the lead in securing and then pro-
tecting the carveout throughout this process. One was the National Auto Dealers 
Association (NADA). After the Senate instructed retention of the Campbell 
Amendment in the conference committee, an industry trade journal described the 
outcome as reflecting “a hard-fought victory for NADA over a powerful coalition 
that included President Barack Obama, the Pentagon, senior Democratic law-
makers, military families, consumer advocates and civil-rights activists.”48 
48. Neil Roland, Dealers Exempted from More Oversight as Finance-Reform Deal Is Reached, 
AUTO. NEWS (June 25, 2010, 5:02 PM), http://www.autonews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/ 
20100625/RETAIL07/100629912/1128 [https://perma.cc/M38V-3U5K]. 
The 
National Independent Automobile Dealers Association (NIADA), an industry 
group representing about 20,000 used car vendors throughout the United States, 
also prioritized the carveout, with much of the work undertaken by the lobbying  
44. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2009) 
(introduced by Rep. Barney Frank). 
45. S. REP. NO. 111-176 (2010). 
46. 156 CONG. REC. S4078 (daily ed. May 20, 2010); see Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 35, at 
695–97 (providing overall legislative history of the Dodd Bill, including distinctions between the initial 
Frank bill and the initial Dodd bill). 
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firm Federal Advocates.49 
49. Federal Advocates provided monthly legislative updates to NIADA from 2009 to 2010 detailing 
its lobbying efforts. See Legislative Archive, NAT’L INDEP. AUTO. DEALERS ASS’N, https://www.niada. 
com/legislative_archive.php [https://perma.cc/3AJF-SBQS] (last visited Mar. 9, 2019). Federal 
Advocates received about $100,000 from NIADA in 2009–2010. Lobbying Database, OPEN SECRETS, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/index.php [https://perma.cc/4JNN-ZNY8] (select “Search database 
by lobbying firm” and then search for “Federal Advocates”; then follow the “Federal Advocates” link; 
then select 2009 and then 2010 from the “Year” drop-down menu). 
50. Letter from Fed. Advocates to Mike Linn & Keith Whann on October 2009 Monthly Report 
(Oct. 27, 2009), https://www.niada.com/PDFs/Information/Legislative/FederalAdvocateReports/2009/ 
Oct2009.pdf. 
A Federal Advocates update from October 2009 high-






Met with Congressional staff to key swing vote members to educate them on 
the bill and its effects on the Auto Industry and NIADA members in 
particular  
Reached out to all [House Financial Services] Committee members[’] offices 
and key staff to alert them to the upcoming vote and NIADA’s position  
Worked with NIADA staff and consultants to develop an ongoing approach 
to [Dodd–Frank]  
Identified Democratic members that should be targeted for calls by NIADA 
members  
Worked with staff members from Rep. Adler and Rep. Kosmas’ office to 
secure their vote for the amendment.50 
Barney Frank, Chair of the House Financial Services Committee, recognized 
the political power of car dealer trade groups, noting that “[t]he local auto dealers 
are very popular in their districts.”51 
51. Ryan Grim & Arthur Delaney, The Cash Committee: How Wall Street Wins on the Hill, 
HUFFINGTON POST (July 11, 2013), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/12/29/the-cash-committee- 
how-wa_n_402373.html [https://perma.cc/6SL8-AV9V]; see also Auto Dealers Near Financial Reform 
Exemption, CBS NEWS (June 23, 2010, 11:30 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/auto-dealers-near- 
financial-reform-exemption/ [https://perma.cc/X3M4-AKEV] (“[T]he political clout of 18,000 auto 
dealers scattered nationwide was too much even for President Barack Obama.”). 
Car dealers have characterized themselves as 
“pillar[s] of the community, an important donor to the town’s nonprofits, and the 
archetypical family business.”52 Although another trade group, the National 
Association of Minority Auto Dealers (NAMAD), expressed support for CFPB 
initiatives to enforce anti-discrimination law in car sales and lending much 
later,53 NAMAD was typically aligned with NADA on CFPB issues during the 
development of Dodd–Frank. In that time window, NAMAD focused its 
52. See Francine Lafontaine & Fiona Scott Morton, State Franchise Laws, Dealer Terminations, and 
the Auto Crisis, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 233, 241 (2010). 
53. See Letter from Damon Lester, President of Nat’l Ass’n of Minority Auto. Dealers, to Hon. 
Maxine Waters (Apr. 23, 2018) (writing that Congressional override of CFPB’s indirect lending 
guidance “will set a horrible precedent, sending a message that our government is not supportive of 
diversity, nor willing to take action that will prevent conscious and unconscious bias”). 
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advocacy (although without significant lobbying expenditures) on ensuring that 
manufacturer winnowing of dealerships did not disproportionately affect minor-
ity-owned businesses and those seeking financial assistance.54 
54. See Ramifications of Auto Industry Bankruptcies: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
111th Cong. 14–15 (2009) (statement of Damon Lester, President, National Association of Minority 
Automobile Dealers). Many minority dealerships folded or were at risk of folding in 2009, and 
NAMAD’s focus at that time seems to have been stemming that tide. NAMAD lobbied for federal 
financial assistance for small minority-owned dealerships through direct lending from the Small 
Business Administration, drawing on practices from the 1979 Chrysler intervention. See Avis Thomas- 
Lester, How Damon Lester Is Leveling the Auto Dealer Playing Field, EBONY (Aug. 12, 2016), http:// 
www.ebony.com/career-finance/damon-lester-namad [https://perma.cc/Y4ZK-QPML]. 
Consumer protection and civil rights advocates mobilized in favor of the estab-
lishment of the CFPB after the financial crisis, and also opposed the auto dealer 
carveout. For example, the Center for Responsible Lending took a leading role in 
these debates,55 
55. See Regulatory Restructuring: Enhancing Consumer Financial Products Regulation: Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 94 (2009) (testimony of Kathleen E. Keest, Senior 
Policy Counsel, Center for Responsible Lending). The Center for Responsible Lending (CRL) is the 
research and policy affiliate of a community development financial institution, the Center for 
Community Self-Help. Id. at 2. CRL takes the position that federal oversight should be a floor, not a 
ceiling, on consumer protection, leaving a role for state law enforcement. See id. at 13. A CRL policy 
brief, for example, claimed “[t]here is widespread agreement that there should be no carveout for auto 
dealers.” CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, AUTO DEALERS SHOULD PLAY BY THE SAME RULES AS 
EVERYONE ELSE (2010), http://www.responsiblelending.org/sites/default/files/nodes/files/research- 
publication/auto-dealers-should-play-by-rules.pdf (naming U.S. Department of Defense, Military 
Coalition, Credit Union National Association, and Independent Community Bankers Association as 
opposed to giving “auto dealers a free ride from CFPB’s consumer protection rules”). 
joined by the Consumer Federation of America.56 
56. See, e.g., Press Release, Consumer Fed’n of Am., Military Groups and the Department of 
Defense Agree–Consumer Financial Protection Agency Should Cover Auto Dealers (Apr. 22, 2010), 
https://consumerfed.org/press_release/military-groups-and-the-department-of-defense-agree-consumer- 
financial-protection-agency-should-cover-auto-dealers/ [https://perma.cc/3T4A-L76J]; see also 
Overview, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., https://consumerfed.org/overview/ [https://perma.cc/QP2F- 
DQDZ] (last visited Mar. 9, 2019) (“As an advocacy organization, CFA works to advance pro-consumer 
policies on a variety of issues before Congress, the White House, federal and state regulatory agencies, 
state legislatures, and the courts. We communicate and work with public officials to promote beneficial 
policies, oppose harmful ones, and ensure a balance debate on issues important to consumers.”). CFA is an 
approximately fifty-year old association of about 300 non-profit consumer organizations with the 
expressed goal of advancing consumer interests through research, advocacy, and education. Id. 
Several dozen 
partner organizations signed onto letters asking Congress “to ensure that all activ-
ities of auto dealers related to the financing of cars are fully included under the ju-
risdiction of the Consumer Financial Protection Agency.”57 Supporters of a 
standalone consumer protection bureau did not want to sacrifice the proposed 
agency over a standoff on auto dealers, however. Tradeoffs were inevitable—the 
57. Letter from A New Way Forward et al. to Hon. Barney Frank, Chairman, U.S. House of Reps. 
Comm. on Fin. Servs., et al., on H.R. 3126 Consumer Financial Protection Agency: Auto Dealer 
Exception (Oct. 7, 2009). Signatories included the NAACP, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, 
National Council of La Raza, DEMOS, National Consumer Law Center Consumers Union, PIRG, and 
Public Citizen. Id.; see also Letter from Consumer Fed’n of Am. to Hon. Barney Frank, Chairman, U.S. 
House of Reps. Comm. on Fin. Servs., & Members of Comm. on Fin. Servs. (Oct. 21, 2009) (urging 
Members of the Committee to vote “No” on the Campbell amendment). 
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price of getting a consumer protection agency with teeth against Wall Street 
actors might lie in exclusions for supposed Main Street actors.58 
In other fights, such as over bankruptcy reform, unions such as the United Auto 
Workers (UAW) have shared positions with consumer advocates.59 Not here. The 
post-crisis period was marked by fear of collapse of the American automobile 
industry and the loss of thousands of dealerships.60 Under such conditions, we are 
not surprised that the UAW would decline to take positions counter to those of 
the distressed auto industry. 
The car dealer carveout was not the industry’s first success in obtaining an 
exemption from significant national legislation. Dealers also have an exemption 
from the Federal Arbitration Act; automobile manufacturers cannot enforce pre- 
dispute arbitration clauses against dealers.61 Widely dispersed and politically 
active, car dealers have been effective lobbyists at the state level as well.62 In the 
aftermath of the GFC, car dealers successfully pushed for new legal protections 
in about two-thirds of states.63 Dealers’ trade groups, coupled with the financial 
services industry, are positioned to respond quickly to proposed state and local 
regulations if they view those bills as harmful to their interests.64 
64. See Letter from Danielle Fagre Arlowe, Senior Vice President, State Gov’t Affairs Am. Fin. 
Servs. Ass’n, to Casey Adams, Deputy Dir. of City Legislative Affairs, N.Y.C. Dep’t of Consumer 
Affairs (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2018/ 
03/AFSA-comment-letter-NYC-secondhand-auto-rules.pdf (“[W]e believe the proposed disclosures 
would confuse consumers and provide little additional consumer benefit.”). 
This facility 
reduces the odds that states will fill gaps in oversight of car dealer deceptive prac-
tices left by the CFPB carveout. 
The auto dealer carveout takes on special significance in light of parallels 
between car lending and pre-crisis home mortgages.65 The volume of car loans 
58. As another example of a Wall Street–Main Street tradeoff, see Jacoby, Dodd-Frank, supra note 
4, at 108–09 (discussing the complex exclusion for doctors and dentists provided in section 1027 of the 
Dodd–Frank Act). 
59. See, e.g., Melissa B. Jacoby, Collecting Debts from the Ill and Injured: The Rhetorical 
Significance, but Practical Irrelevance, of Culpability and Ability to Pay, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 229, 268 
n.167 (2001) (citing congressional testimony of both the United Auto Workers and the National 
Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys about the difficult problems individuals face that lead 
them to bankruptcy); Susan Jensen, A Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2005, AM. BANKR. L.J. 485, 498 n.73 (2005) (reporting that the United 
Auto Workers testified in hearings on consumer bankruptcy); Elizabeth Warren, The Market for Data: 
The Changing Role of Social Sciences in Shaping the Law, 2002 WISC. L. REV. 1, 9 n.22 (reporting 
involvement of United Auto Workers, along with the Consumer Federation of America and Consumers 
Union, in providing a perspective on bankruptcy reform distinct from the consumer credit industry). 
60. See Lafontaine & Morton, supra note 52, at 233. Many of these dealerships were terminated 
notwithstanding the government intervention. See id. at 236 (listing number of dealerships by brand 
and year). 
61. See S. REP. NO. 107-266 (2002) (applying to franchise contracts). 
62. See Lafontaine & Morton, supra note 52, at 234 (explaining that “car dealerships, and especially 
local or state car dealership associations, have been able to exert influence over local legislatures,” 
increasing costs and prices, particularly for Detroit’s “Big Three” car manufacturers). 
63. See id. at 248. 
65. See Andrew Haughwout et al., Just Released: Who Is Driving the Auto Lending Recovery?, 
LIBERTY ST. ECON. (Aug. 14, 2013), http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2013/08/just- 
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released-who-is-driving-the-auto-lending-recovery.html [https://perma.cc/6SYE-WKMH] (providing a 
recounting of this analogy by researchers at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York); see also Jessica 
Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, In a Subprime Bubble for Used Cars, Borrowers Pay Sky-High 
Rates, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (July 19, 2014, 12:36 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/07/19/ 
in-a-subprime-bubble-for-used-cars-unfit-borrowers-pay-sky-high-rates/ [https://nyti.ms/2kgtGr4] 
(drawing same analogy). 
exceeds the volume of mortgage loans,66 
66. Stifler Testimony, supra note 35 (citing U.S. Census Bureau data). More than eight out of ten 
people in the U.S. workforce use cars to get to their jobs. See id. (citing Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York data); see also Gunjan Banerji, When Does Consumer Debt Become a Systemic Risk?, WALL ST. 
J. MONEYBEAT (Oct. 30, 2017, 12:18 PM), https://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2017/10/30/when-does- 
consumer-debt-become-a-systemic-risk/ [https://perma.cc/YH35-4ZYL] (reporting that U.S. consumer 
loans “make up almost half of the global consumer debt growth” in the past decade, prompting notice by 
ratings agencies and major U.S. banks); Stijn Claessens & Laura Kodres, The Regulatory Responses to 
the Global Financial Crisis: Some Uncomfortable Questions, in POLICY SHOCK, supra note 1, at 435, 
439 (discussing difficulties when rising household leverage and high levels of consumer debt defaults 
are contributors to systemic financial crisis). 
which, as is now well known, contrib-
uted significantly to the GFC. Lisa Stifler, Deputy Director of State Policy at the 
Center for Responsible Lending, testified in 2015: 
We are also seeing practices in the auto lending market that mirror those in the 
mortgage market prior to the housing crisis. Risk layering—combining several 
practices that increase the risk of delinquency or default—is increasing. The 
size and length of loans continues to grow. Delinquency and default rates are 
climbing in auto lending while falling for other forms of credit. One lesson we 
hopefully learned from the crisis is to take heed of troubling data and act to 
prevent needless losses and harms to consumers, not wait for them to occur.67 
67. Stifler Testimony, supra note 35. According to CRL, the fact that cars can and do get repossessed 
on much shorter timelines than residential home foreclosures increases the salience for overall systemic 
risk. See CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, “RECKLESS DRIVING”: IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT SUBPRIME 
AUTO FINANCE GROWTH 5 (2015), https://www.responsiblelending.org/other-consumer-loans/auto- 
financing/research-analysis/recklessdriving_implications_subprime_autofinance_growth.pdf. 
Much auto lending growth since the GFC has been subprime,68 and underwrit-
ing standards have eroded in the last decade.69 Features of subprime and “Deep 
Subprime” loans include longer repayment schedules, higher average loan-to- 
value ratios, and higher interest rates than other auto loans.70 
Finally, it is worth noting that some of Dodd–Frank’s substantive reforms that 
might have been useful in many loan contexts, including car loans, applied only 
to residential mortgages, in light of Dodd–Frank’s heightened post-crisis focus 
on that particular financial product. For example, Dodd–Frank amended the 
Truth in Lending Act to require verification of income in most mortgage loan cir-
cumstances, thus prohibiting “stated-income” home mortgage loans.71 The prohi-
bition does not apply to car loans, where the practice has become common. 
68. See Stifler Testimony, supra note 35, at 2 (citing Experian Automotive data). 
69. See CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 67, at 3. 
70. See id. (reporting Experian Automotive data). 
71. See Dodd–Frank § 1411, 15 U.S.C. § 1639c (2012) (amending the Truth in Lending Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 1631 (2006)). Stated-income loans are loans in which a lender or facilitator takes the 
borrower’s assertion of income at face value without verification, and sometimes inflates the income of 
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C. “ROBOSIGNING 2.0”72 
Our second case study, also focusing on the CFPB’s anti-deception efforts, 
looks at the CFPB’s actions in response to robosigning in the residential mortgage 
market, a flashpoint during and after the GFC, and the student debt market.73 
73. Although we focus here on the comparison of mortgages and student loans, the CFPB has 
brought a considerable number of robosigning-related cases against credit card issuers and general debt 
buyers. See, e.g., CFPB, 47 States and D.C. Take Action Against JPMorgan Chase for Selling Bad 
Credit Card Debt and Robo-Signing Court Documents, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (July 8, 2015), 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-47-states-and-d-c-take-action-against- 
jpmorgan-chase-for-selling-bad-credit-card-debt-and-robo-signing-court-documents/ [https://perma.cc/ 
HJ94-M9AZ] (discussing CFPB action against credit card company JPMorgan Chase); CFPB Takes 
Action Against the Two Largest Buyers for Using Deceptive Tactics to Collect Bad Debts, CONSUMER 
FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-takes- 
action-against-the-two-largest-debt-buyers-for-using-deceptive-tactics-to-collect-bad-debts/ [https:// 
perma.cc/D59S-NV9Q] (discussing CFPB action against debt-buying companies Encore Capital 
Corporation and Portfolio Recovery Associates). 
With respect to robosigning, we find that the open-ended nature of CFPB author-
ity facilitates robust regulatory action for an agency ready, willing, and able to 
use that authority. Indeed, Congress’s delegation of power, without a carveout of 
key parties, enabled the CFPB to extend its regulatory efforts beyond the immedi-
ate crisis-related concerns that prompted policy responses. 
Coined in the aftermath of the mortgage servicing crisis, the term “robosign-
ing” has been used to describe various illegal practices in the mortgage industry. 
We use it in this Article to refer to the systemic practice of signing mortgage 
documents that attest to the validity of a company’s ownership of a mortgage 
debt without actual knowledge or confirmation of the loan’s chain of title and sta-
tus. At the peak of the foreclosure crisis, a series of legal cases revealed that some 
robosigners executed unsubstantiated affidavits for the purposes of pursuing debt 
collection and foreclosure even though they could not prove they had the legal 
right to take those actions. For example, one robosigner later admitted in a sworn 
deposition that “she [had] signed off on thousands of foreclosures in a month for 
JPMorgan Chase even though she did not verify the accuracy of the 
information.”74 
the borrower (potentially without the borrower’s knowledge) to obtain financing. These practices made 
consumers legally responsible for loans outstripping their ability to repay, increasing default risk. See, 
e.g., A. Mechele Dickerson, The Myth of Home Ownership and Why Home Ownership Is Not Always a 
Good Thing, 84 IND. L.J. 189, 200 (2009) (identifying alternative nicknames for stated-income loans, 
defining the terms, and how lenders shielded themselves from the rising risk); Deborah Goldstein & 
Matthew Brinegar, Policy and Litigation Barriers to Fighting Predatory Lending, 2 N.E. U. L.J. 167, 
184 (2010) (describing stated-income loans and associated foreclosure risk). See generally Diane M. 
Standaert & Sara K. Weed, Secure Transactions: Restoring Our Communities with Responsible 
Lending, 19 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 71 (2009) (analyzing the origins of “the 
foreclosure crisis” and suggesting “state-level policy solutions” to predatory mortgage market 
practices). 
72. Natalie Kitroeff, The Student Debt Collection Mess, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, June 8–14, 
2015, at 45 (quoting Robyn Smith of the National Consumer Law Center). 
74. Ariana Eunjung Cha & Brady Dennis, Amid Mountain of Paperwork, Shortcuts and Forgeries 
Mar Foreclosure Process, WASH. POST (Sept. 23, 2010, 2:36 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/22/AR2010092206132.html [https://perma.cc/8HU8-Q9XT]. 
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Although we now know that mortgage robosigning was commonplace before 
the GFC, Dodd–Frank did not address the practice explicitly because it received 
little or no publicity until after the bill’s enactment.75 
75. See, e.g., Robbie Whelan, Niche Lawyers Spawned Housing Fracas, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 21, 
2010, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304410504575560072576527604 
[https://perma.cc/X8SW-MU29] (reporting on 2006 discovery by attorney that mortgage company 
employee who signed off on his clients’ mortgage documents did not review the underlying loan 
documents and routinely signed off on mortgages without required verification of documents); Debra 
Cassens Weiss, How 2 Pro Bono Lawyers Uncovered ‘Robo-Signer,’ Halting Foreclosures in 23 States, 
ABA J. (Sept. 23, 2010, 1:20 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/how_2_pro_bono_lawyers_ 
uncovered_robo-signer_halting_foreclosures_in_23_sta [https://perma.cc/PP2B-9BFE]; Cha & Dennis, 
supra note 74 (reporting on sworn deposition of JPMorgan Chase employee that she signed off on 
thousands of foreclosures a month even though she did not verify the accuracy of the information). 
Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) Chair Sheila C. Bair remarked in October 2010 that federal 
bank regulators only recently had become aware of robosigning.76 
76. Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Remarks to Urban Land Inst. (Oct. 13, 2010), 
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/archives/2010/spoct1310.html [https://perma.cc/CZX5- 
FJLL] (“And now we have the added concern that lenders may have been foreclosing on homes without 
proper documentation. The ‘robo-signing’ of foreclosure documents is a serious matter for loan 
servicers, homeowners, and the entire industry.”). 
Although an 
FBI investigation into the practice had begun in Florida before Dodd–Frank’s 
enactment, the local office did not receive authorization from the Washington 
office to accelerate its inquiry until later.77 
77. See David Dayen, Inside the Abortive FBI Investigation of Illegal Foreclosure in Florida, VICE (May 
31, 2016, 4:30 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/yvxajb/what-happened-when-the-fbi-investigated- 
foreclosure-fraud-in-florida [https://perma.cc/Z92S-Q8EJ] (reporting on investigation of Florida document 
processing services, falsification of foreclosure documents, and signatures for major banks). 
In 2012, the National Mortgage Settlement imposed new foreclosure document 
verification obligations, at least among the signatories to those consent decrees.78 
78. See Settlement Documents, JOINT STATE-FED. NAT’L MORTG. SERVICING SETTLEMENTS, http:// 
www.nationalmortgagesettlement.com/settlement-documents [https://perma.cc/54MG-RHGU] (last 
visited Mar. 9, 2019) (displaying consent decree documents that include new foreclosure documentation 
rules); see also Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Federal Government and State Attorneys General Reach 
$25 Billion Agreement with 5 Largest Mortgage Servicers to Address Mortgage Loan Servicing and 
Foreclosure Abuses (Feb. 9, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-government-and-state- 
attorneys-general-reach-25-billion-agreement-five-largest [https://perma.cc/5EMN-EL5U]. The New 
Jersey Supreme Court issued its own rules on the matter earlier. See Administrative Order Directing 
Submission of Information from Residential Mortgage Foreclosure Plaintiffs Concerning Their 
Document Execution Practices to a Special Place, In re Residential Mortg. Foreclosure Pleading & 
Document Irregularities, No. 01-2010 (N.J. Dec. 20, 2010), https://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/notices/ 
2010/n101220b.pdf (ordering all banks and companies that filed more than 200 foreclosure actions in 
2010 to submit evidence that foreclosure verification practices are sufficient). 
These new foreclosure document verification obligations included numerous 
requirements meant to ensure that affiants of foreclosure documents verified the 
chain of title of the underlying debt.79 The Settlement also required that mortgage 
servicers take steps to ensure the veracity (and presence) of all documentation 
needed to prove existence and ownership of the borrower’s underlying debt when 
seeking to foreclose on a mortgage.80 
79. See, e.g., Consent Judgment Ex. A at A-1, United States v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 1:12-cv- 
00361-RMC (D.D.C. 2012). 
80. See id. 
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Beyond the National Mortgage Settlement, the CFPB has been able to use the 
tools afforded by the Dodd–Frank Act to tackle robosigning against mortgage 
servicers.81 For instance, in September 2014, the CFPB and fifty state attorneys 
general entered into a consent judgment with SunTrust Bank related to a host of 
harmful servicing practices, including robosigning.82 Modeled on the National 
Mortgage Settlement, the CFPB alleged SunTrust’s inadequate loan origination, 
servicing and foreclosure procedures constituted violations of state and federal 
unfair and deceptive acts and practices laws.83 
More recently, observers have drawn analogies between pre-GFC mortgage 
debt problems and student loan servicing.84 
84. See Stacy Cowley & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, As Paperwork Goes Missing, Private Student 
Loan Debts May Be Wiped Away, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (July 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes. 
com/2017/07/17/business/dealbook/student-loan-debt-collection.html [https://nyti.ms/2vvroKs] (“Some 
of the problems playing out now in the $108 billion private student loan market are reminiscent of those 
that arose from the subprime mortgage crisis a decade ago, when billions of dollars in subprime 
mortgage loans were ruled uncollectible by courts because of missing or fake documentation.”). 
Academics flagged the potential for 
similar problems in student loans as early as 2014.85 Robosigning is among those 
parallels, now documented in news reports and litigation. Debt collectors and 
debt buyers have sued student loan borrowers in state court without proper docu-
mentation to prove the right to enforce the underlying debt.86 
86. See Natalie Kitroeff, The Lawsuit Machine Going After Student Debtors, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (June 4, 2015, 7:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-04/the- 
student-debt-collection-mess [https://perma.cc/N2LD-N7C9]. This practice has gone on in the general 
debt collection context for a lot longer. See Peter A. Holland, The One Hundred Billion Dollar 
Problem in Small Claims Court: Robo-Signing and Lack of Proof in Debt Buyer Cases, 6 J. BUS. & 
TECH. L. 259, 271–72 (2011); see also Dalié Jiménez, Dirty Debts Sold Dirt Cheap, 52 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 41, 44, 55 (2015). 
In contrast to the insulation of auto dealers from CFPB oversight, the Dodd– 
Frank Act did not carve out student loan servicers, leaving the CFPB free to use its 
general legal and regulatory tools in response to student loan robosigning. For 
example, the CFPB obtained a consent order relating to Transworld Systems Inc.’s 
(TSI) widespread student loan debt collection practices that involved the hallmarks 
of robosigning—false affidavits and filing lawsuits without any evidence that they 
had the right to enforce the debt.87 
87. See Consent Order at 2, In re Transworld Sys., Inc., 2017-CFPB-0018 (Sept. 15, 2017). See 
generally Stacy Cowley & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Behind the Lucrative Assembly Line of Student 
Debt Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/13/ 
business/dealbook/student-debt-lawsuits.html [https://nyti.ms/2jlqMpZ] (reporting that TSI has filed 
The CFPB’s jurisdiction over TSI is  
81. Sections 1031(a) and 1036 of Dodd–Frank empower the CFPB to take action against unfair, 
deceptive, or abusive acts or practices against consumers. See Dodd–Frank Act §§ 1031(a), 1036, 12 
U.S.C. §§ 5531(a), 5536 (2012). 
82. See Consent Judgment at 1–2, United States v. SunTrust Mortg., Inc., No. 14-1028 (RMC) (D.D.C. 
Sept. 30, 2014). 
83. See Complaint at 17, United States v. SunTrust Mortg., Inc., No. 14-1028 (D.D.C. June 14, 
2014). 
85. See Jamie P. Hopkins & Katherine A. Pustizzi, A Blast from the Past: Are the Robo-Signing 
Issues That Plagued the Mortgage Crisis Set to Engulf the Student Loan Industry?, 45 U. TOLEDO 
L. REV. 239, 240 (2014). 
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not in question.88 
Of course, robosigning has not been the only allegation of trouble in consumer 
loan servicing. Here again, the National Mortgage Settlement played a role in 
addressing some problems in that context.89 The Settlement imposed global serv-
icing standards, beyond foreclosure document verification, designed to keep 
more borrowers out of the foreclosure process.90 The Settlement required that 
mortgage servicers notify borrowers of “currently available loss mitigation 
options prior to foreclosure referral,” including loan modification options.91 
Servicers also had to establish a “single point of contact” for struggling bor-
rowers, which minimized the potential for communication issues and conflicting 
information arising from dealing with multiple servicer representatives, while 
reducing the risk that debtors would turn to predatory loan modification 
services.92 
When similar problems emerged with respect to student loans, the CFPB and 
state attorneys general sued Navient, the nation’s largest federal student loan 
servicer, for “illegally failing borrowers at every stage of repayment.”93 
93. See CFPB Sues Nation’s Largest Student Loan Company Navient for Failing Borrowers at Every 




plaint identifies servicing issues addressed in the National Mortgage Settlement; 
Navient (and by all accounts, other student loan servicers) tends to steer bor-
rowers into repayment options that are not the borrower’s best option.94 
Borrowers also complained of receiving conflicting information from Navient 
representatives,95 
95. See CFPB Monthly Snapshot Highlights Student Loan Complaints, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. 
BUREAU: NEWSROOM (Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb- 
monthly-snapshot-spotlights-student-loan-complaints/ [https://perma.cc/8WYP-JXTB]. As of June 
2018, the case remained in the discovery phase. 
which, like mortgage servicing problems, can lead to student 
loan defaults that would otherwise have been avoidable. 
In summary, with regard to many consumer protection issues posed by decep-
tive loan servicing practices, the Global Financial Crisis cast a wider policy 
shadow. Even though the architects of the Dodd–Frank Act did not legislate a 
response to mortgage servicing problems like robosigning, the CFPB was none-
theless able to address mortgage and student loan servicing problems as they 
emerged by drawing on its basic legal and regulatory toolbox. 
more than 38,000 lawsuits within three years on behalf of single clients and many cases were flawed due 
to robo-signing features). 
88. Consent Order, supra note 87, at 6. 
89. Although Dodd–Frank mandates income verification in mortgage lending, Dodd–Frank Act 
§ 1411, 15 U.S.C. 1639c (2012), most mentions of mortgages in Dodd–Frank are in the context of 
gathering data and refinements to foreclosure prevention programs to the two foreclosure programs 
established by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-334, §§ 101, 102, 122 
Stat. 3765, 3767–70 (2008), both of which ended in 2016. 
90. See, e.g., Consent Judgment, supra note 79, Ex. A at A-16. 
91. See id. 
92. See id. at A-21. 
94. See Complaint ¶ 4, CFPB v. Navient Corp., 3:17-cv-00101-RDM (M.D. Pa. 2017). 
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D. OPERATION CHOKE POINT 
Our final case study, Operation Choke Point (OCP), demonstrates how a crisis 
can prompt especially aggressive policy experimentation, even in the absence of 
legislative mandates. This endeavor further demonstrates the vulnerability of 
such post-crisis policy innovations to political counterattacks, especially when 
the relevant bureaucracies do not build wider support and the initiatives run afoul 
of the perceived interests of well-coordinated business groups. 
In contrast to intentionally publicized antifraud enforcement initiatives by the 
FTC and CFPB, OCP emerged outside the glare of legislative politics and press 
coverage.96 It would not stay hidden for long, however, eventually attracting con-
siderable public criticism from trade associations and Republican legislators, 
among others.97 In many ways, this enforcement campaign represented a knock- 
on effect of the GFC. Key leaders in the Obama Administration attributed the 
crisis in part to a soft enforcement posture toward business fraud.98 
98. See Shahien Nasiripour, Obama to Form Mortgage Fraud Task Force, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 25, 
2012), https://www.ft.com/content/d1a34214-470a-11e1-85e2-00144feabdc0 [https://perma.cc/QHJ6- 
RR9B]. 
The disincli-
nation to tackle frauds in mortgage origination, despite stark warnings from the 
FBI,99 
99. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, MORTGAGE FRAUD REPORT 2006 (2007), https://www.fbi.gov/ 
stats-services/publications/mortgage-fraud-2006 [https://perma.cc/T9RL-RJV9]. 
received especially sharp criticism from academics, members of Congress, 
and the majority report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission.100 
To shore up the government’s anti-fraud efforts, President Obama established 
an interagency Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force (FFETF) soon after tak-
ing office in 2009.101 
101. See Exec. Order No. 13,519, 74 Fed. Reg. 60,123, (Nov. 17, 2009); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, Att’y Gen. Eric Holder Launches Consumer Protection Working Group to Combat 
Consumer Fraud (Feb. 10, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-eric-holder- 
launches-consumer-protection-working-group-combat-consumer-fraud [https://perma.cc/HL7C-5UJ2]. 
Convened by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), the 
FFETF drew on representatives from twenty-two other federal cabinet depart-
ments, independent commissions, and other agencies, as well as officials from the 
offices of state attorneys general and local law enforcement.102 According to 
then-Attorney General Eric Holder, this task force would not simply “hold ac-
countable those who helped bring about the last financial meltdown.”103 
103. Sam Youngman, President Obama Creates New Task Force to Crack Down on Financial 
Fraud, HILL (Nov. 17, 2009, 5:58 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/68123-obama- 
creates-new-agency-to-target-financial-fraud [https://perma.cc/5CEP-B434]. 
96. In the Proquest database, which includes government documents and major newspapers, there is 
no mention of Operation Choke Point until January 2014, more than a year after federal officials began 
the effort. 
97. See infra note 110 and accompanying text. 
100. See generally Brooksley Born, Financial Reform and the Causes of the Financial Crisis, 
Keynote Address at the 2011 Am. Univ. Bus. Law Review Symposium: Law, Finance, and Legitimacy 
After Financial Reform (Apr. 8, 2011), in 1 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1, 1–6 (2012); Ross MacDonald, Note, 
Setting Examples, Not Settling: Toward a New SEC Enforcement Paradigm, 91 TEX. L. REV. 419 
(2012). 
102. See Exec. Order No. 13,519, 74 Fed. Reg. 60,123 (Nov. 17, 2009). 
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Reflecting lessons learned from the GFC, the task force would “prevent another 
meltdown from happening.”104 
The FFETF assessed the threats posed by all manners of financial fraud during 
the Obama Administration’s first term. This review led lawyers in the DOJ’s 
Consumer Protection Branch to focus on the extent to which, as American com-
merce had come to rely on online commerce, fraudulent businesses greatly 
depended on third-party processors to transmit customer funds.105 
105. See Michael J. Bresnick, Exec. Dir., Fin. Fraud Enf’t Task Force, Office of the Deputy Att’y 
Gen., Dep’t of State, Remarks to the Exchequer Club of Washington, D.C. (Mar. 20, 2013), https:// 
www.justice.gov/opa/speech/financial-fraud-enforcement-task-force-executive-director-michael-j-bresnick- 
exchequer [https://perma.cc/BEQ2-CW2P]. 
In doing so, 
DOJ lawyers followed the lead of an Assistant United States Attorney in the 
Philadelphia office, Joel Sweet, who had brought a series of criminal fraud cases 
against payment processors.106 DOJ lawyers also observed that a relatively small 
number of banks and credit card processors were responsible for a large fraction 
of cyberspace transactions, including those involving consumer fraud. By 2012, 
officials in the DOJ’s Consumer Protection Branch accordingly sought to prevent 
deceptive practices by targeting the online payment mechanism rather than just 
prosecuting consumer frauds after the fact.107 
107. Kevin Wack, Five Takeaways from Internal DOJ Documents on Operation Choke Point, AM. 
BANKER (May 30, 2014, 4:51 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/five-takeaways-from- 
internal-doj-documents-on-operation-choke-point [https://perma.cc/AY32-ELWK]. 
In essence, they saw the payment 
mechanism as a “choke point” for access to consumer expenditures. 
The resulting anti-fraud campaign, OCP, had two primary prongs. The first 
involved tough-minded enforcement actions against a relatively small number of 
specific financial institutions connected to fraudulent businesses, often triggered 
by extraordinarily high consumer rejection rates for commercial banking transac-
tions.108 A typical rejection rate ranges between 0.5% and 1.5%.109 When finan-
cial intermediaries reported return rates “exceed[ing] 30%, 40%, 50%, and even 
85%,” anti-fraud officials viewed such data as not just “glaring red flags indica-
tive of fraud,” but as “ambulance sirens, screaming out for attention.”110 Such 
scrutiny took the form of vigorous investigations through subpoenas and other 
means, and a smaller number of criminal and civil fraud proceedings, such as the 
one that the DOJ brought against the First Bank of Delaware, which resulted in a 
$15 million fine and forced the bank to close.111 
The second prong took advantage of the shift in the regulatory environment 
created by selective enforcement actions and relied heavily on moral suasion. 
104. Id. 
106. See Jeri Leigh McDowell, Comment, Insidious Design or Instrument of Progress: The Multi- 
Agency Initiative to Choke Off Undesirable Businesses’ Access to the Financial World, 47 TEX. 
TECH. L. REV. 803, 809 (2015) (describing Sweet’s career and relationship to the origins of 
Operation Choke Point). 
108. See Bresnick, supra note 105. 
109. See id. 
110. See id. 
111. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Banks Faulted as Taking Role in Web Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, June 
11, 2013, at A1. 
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Working closely with regulators at the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
and the Federal Depository Insurance Corporation, lawyers at the DOJ’s 
Consumer Protection Branch disseminated information about the warning signs 
that should alert banks to fraudulent marketing by the firms that relied on them 
for payment processing.112 
112. See Michael B. Benardo et al., Managing Risks in Third-Party Payment Processor 
Relationships, FDIC: SUPERVISORY INSIGHTS - SUMMER 2011 (2011), https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/ 
examinations/supervisory/insights/sisum11/managing.html [https://perma.cc/U276-CCZJ] (last updated 
July 14, 2014). 
Regulators also circulated an FDIC-created list of eco-
nomic sectors characterized by a relatively high incidence of fraudulent market-
ing.113 
113. The FDIC lists business types it considers at “high risk” of fraud, including providers of: payday 
loans, pornography, escort services, firearms, home-based charities, credit repair services, credit card 
schemes, pyramid schemes, surveillance equipment, lottery sales, lifetime memberships, travel clubs, 
and money transfer networks. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., REPORT NO. AUD-15-008, THE FDIC’S ROLE 
IN OPERATION CHOKE POINT AND SUPERVISORY APPROACH TO INSTITUTIONS THAT CONDUCTED 
BUSINESS WITH MERCHANTS ASSOCIATED WITH HIGH-RISK ACTIVITIES 7 tbl. (2015), https://www.fdicig. 
gov/sites/default/files/publications/15-008AUD.pdf. 
After DOJ lawyers identified firms engaging in apparently deceptive 
business practices or, in some cases, operating in industries likely to have high 
incidences of fraud, banking regulators recommended that banks shun those 
firms, out of concern for their own reputational capital.114 The presumption was 
that “banks should endeavor not only to know their customers, but also to know 
their customers’ customers.”115 Without such due diligence into the backgrounds 
of those firms who used their payment platforms, banks ran a considerable risk of 
“allowing some unscrupulous scam artist to be taking the last dollars of a senior 
citizen who fell prey to another fraud scheme, and hundreds of millions of dollars 
of additional proceeds of fraud to flow through their institutions.”116 Careful vet-
ting by banks, FFETF leaders hoped, would significantly curb predatory behav-
ior, including the type that had helped to cause the GFC, without excessive 
expenditure of public resources.117 
117. See, e.g., Jeremy Kidd, The Economics of Workplace Drug Testing, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 707, 
734–35 (2016); Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Justice Department Inquiry Takes Aim at Banks’ Business 
With Payday Lenders, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Jan. 26, 2014, 9:59 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/ 
2014/01/26/justice-dept-inquiry-takes-aim-at-banks-business-with-payday-lenders/ [https://nyti.ms/ 
2lKfauE]. 
The activities associated with OCP continued through the remainder of the 
Obama Administration. OCP-related investigations led the DOJ and other federal 
agencies to issue more than fifty subpoenas to financial institutions and pursue a 
handful of fraud cases against individual banks alleging they had systematically 
facilitated consumer scams.118 As with the investigation into the First Bank of 
Delaware, these cases also resulted in consent decrees that mandated multimillion  
114. See Bresnick, supra note 105. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
118. See Richard P. Eckman et al., Update on the Short-Term Lending Industry: Government 
Investigations and Enforcement Actions, 70 BUS. LAW. 657, 658 (2015); Silver-Greenberg, supra note 111. 
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dollar settlements and revamped business practices.119 More generally, officials 
pressured financial service providers to investigate their business customers more 
closely. The resulting scrutiny caused scores of firms to lose access to online pay-
ment systems, including some that may not have been engaging in wrongful ac-
tivity, significantly compromising their abilities to conduct business.120 
As a post-crisis regulatory initiative, OCP bears some key hallmarks of bureau-
cratic entrepreneurship: policy innovation developed by unelected federal offi-
cials, drawing creatively on existing grants of authority and redeploying them, 
with an experimental mindset, to address a thorny problem.121 
121. See generally DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: 
REPUTATIONS, NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, at 1862–1928 (Ira 
Katznelson et al. eds., 2001). The Director of the DOJ’s Consumer Protection Branch described OCP as 
“born of experimentation and based on collaboration,” and as “continually being refined and developed 
as we implement it.” Michael Blume, Dir., Consumer Prot. Branch, Civil Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Plenary Address to the National Consumer Law Center’s 22nd Annual Consumer Rights Litigation 
Conference (Nov. 8, 2013), reprinted in STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, 113TH 
CONG., THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S “OPERATION CHOKEPOINT”: ILLEGALLY CHOKING OFF 
LEGITIMATE BUSINESSES? app.1, at 473 (2014), [http://perma.cc/F2SM-9SES]. 
OCP also mirrored 
prior efforts to tackle business fraud. In the 1970s, for example, the Division of 
Enforcement at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) began to target 
law and accounting firms that provided services to corporations that they sus-
pected of violating the securities laws.122 This approach, SEC officials concluded, 
would maximize the impact of scarce enforcement resources.123 Through govern-
mental pressure, the SEC hoped to enlist these private gatekeepers in snuffing out 
dodgy corporate practices before they harmed investors.124 A full century earlier, 
officials in the Post Office Department had similarly fashioned the administrative 
fraud order to combat deception in the mail order sector.125 Once issued, a fraud 
order denied a firm access to the mails.126 These antifraud initiatives acted as de 
facto de-licensing regimes, closing off access to some key channel of commerce. 
OCP shared another feature with the postal fraud order regime, at least in the 
latter’s early decades—a lack of due process. Before the early twentieth century, 
the Post Office frequently issued fraud orders without hearings or notice, simply 
on the basis of evidence supplied by postal inspectors.127 Similarly, businesses 
confronting heightened scrutiny from banks or payment processors as a result of  
119. See generally Sarah Jane Hughes & Stephen T. Middlebrook, Developments in the Law 
Affecting Electronic Payments and Financial Services, 71 BUS. LAW. 361 (2015) (reviewing OCP- 
related enforcement actions and outcomes). Other financial institutions that faced OCP-related legal 
action include Four Oaks Bank & Trust of North Carolina, Plaza Bank, and CommerceWest. Id. at 
370–71. 
120. For an example of a harmed business, see McDowell, supra note 106, at 828–29. 
122. See BALLEISEN, supra note 4, at 324–25. 
123. Id. at 325. 
124. Id. 
125. See id. at 128–39. 
126. See id. at 131. 
127. Id. at 213. 
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OCP did so as a result of informal judgments rather than formal administrative 
process.128 
Due process concerns about both initiatives prompted stinging criticism from 
affected businesses as inconsistent with democratic norms and the rule of law, 
and as representing an instance of poorly designed regulatory overreach.129 With 
regard to OCP, financial service firms and businesses in “high risk” sectors 
wasted little time in lambasting the enforcement campaign. Third-party process-
ors formed a trade association to offer guidance to members on avoiding regula-
tory scrutiny, but also to lobby Congress against OCP.130 
130. See ATMIA Capitol Hill Meetings Focus on “Operation Choke Point,” BUS. WIRE (Feb. 9, 
2016, 7:05 AM), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20160209005338/en/ATMIA-Capitol-Hill- 
Meetings-Focus-Operation-Choke [https://perma.cc/3XUV-FHSH]. 
Other groups that 
represented business sectors singled out by the OCP as having heightened risks of 
fraud, including gun dealers and payday lenders, joined the fray.131 
131. See Jonathan Shorman, Gun Industry to Kansas Lawmakers: Protect Us from Discrimination, 
TOPEKA CAP.-J. (Jan. 28, 2016, 11:32 AM), https://www.cjonline.com/2016-04-06/stub-1275 [https:// 
perma.cc/T5D8-NDZE]; Justice Dept. Tries to Quell Bank, Processor Concerns About Online Lending 
Probe, AM. BANKER (Jan. 23, 2014, 4:06 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/justice-dept- 
tries-to-quell-bank-processor-concerns-about-online-lending-probe [https://perma.cc/SMB5-43NX]. 
The oppo-
nents of OCP found ready allies among conservative think tanks such as the 
Heritage Foundation, and champions among congressional Republicans, who 
called hearings to highlight what they viewed as OCP’s regulatory overreach.132 
The House of Representatives also sought to literally choke OCP by cutting off 
funding to the FDIC that could be used for this operation.133 Although some con-
sumer organizations and the occasional elected Democratic politician defended  
128. See Eckman et al., supra note 118, at 659–60. 
129. For more on the critique of the fraud order process as ignoring requirements imposed by the rule 
of law, see BALLEISEN, supra note 4, at 209–24. 
132. See, e.g., The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s Role in Operation Choke Point: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 114th 
Cong. 2 (2015) (statement of Rep. Duffy, Chairman, Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations) 
(describing the FDIC’s purpose through the OCP as “to choke off the business they don’t like from the 
banking system”); Who’s in Your Wallet: Examining How Washington Red Tape Impairs Economic 
Freedom: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 113th Cong. 56 (2014) (statement of Rep. 
Stivers) (“The Operation Choke Point really has me worried about the overreach of government and 
government shutting down properly licensed State businesses with which they just don’t agree.”); The 
Department of Justice’s “Operation Choke Point”: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & 
Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 113th Cong. 2 (2014) (statement of Rep. McHenry, 
Chairman, Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations) (criticizing OCP as “employing an axe rather than 
a scalpel” as part of a grander “game plan to circumvent the rule of law and Congress to achieve 
ideological objectives”); Guilty until Proven Innocent? A Study of the Propriety and Legal Authority for 
the Justice Department’s Operation Choke Point: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, 
Commercial & Antitrust Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 2 (2014) (statement of Rep. 
Bachus, Chairman, Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial & Antitrust Law) (describing the 
businesses targeted by OCP as comprising a “very wide net” suggestive of “agency overreach”).  
133. 161 CONG. REC. H3805–07 (daily ed. June 3, 2015) (approving amendment to defund OCP); see 
Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 119, at 371 (reviewing legislation relevant to OCP). 
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the program, the anti-OCP advocacy coalition principally shaped public discus-
sion of the initiative during that period.134 
134. For a prominent Democrat’s rare effort to make the case for OCP, see Joe Sestak, Make Banks 
Ask, Tell, TIMES-TRIBUNE (July 25, 2014), http://www.thetimes-tribune.com/opinion/make-banks-ask- 
tell-1.1724503 [https://perma.cc/QB5E-2E3V]. Coverage and discussion of OCP in The Washington 
Post was typical: news stories from Danielle Douglas stressed Republican concerns and criticisms; Todd 
Zywicki devoted a series of blogposts to covering attacks on OCP by conservative organizations. See, 
e.g., Danielle Douglas, Republicans to Justice Dept.: Stop Targeting Legal Businesses in ‘Operation 
Choke Point,’ WASH. POST (July 17, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/ 
republicans-to-justice-dept-stop-targeting-legal-businesses-in-operation-choke-point/2014/07/17/ 
94cf6b9a-0dc0-11e4-8c9a-923ecc0c7d23_story.html?utm_term=.4fd1b8714afa [https://perma.cc/3YPB- 
SSPZ]; Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Operation Choke Point: The Battle Over Financial Data Between the 
Government and Banks, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Apr. 16, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/wonk/wp/2014/04/16/operation-choke-point-the-battle-over-financial-data-between-the-government- 
and-banks/?utm_term=.96674b66ea10 [https://perma.cc/7C6M-BDFC]; Todd Zywicki, FDIC Retreats 
on Operation Choke Point?, WASH. POST: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 29, 2015), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/01/29/fdic-retreats-on-operation-choke-point/? 
noredirect=on&utm_term=.cf18f6de7534 [https://perma.cc/9ZLF-VU8D]; Todd Zywicki, Federalist 
Society Teleforum on Operation Choke Point, WASH. POST: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 16, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/06/16/teleforum-on-operation- 
choke-point/?utm_term=.47dbd851700f [https://perma.cc/43CT-9DBV]; Todd Zywicki, “Operation 
Choke Point,” WASH. POST: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 24, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/05/24/operation-choke-point/?utm_term=.cd5abe18e65d 
[https://perma.cc/FE7E-XNKL]. 
By creating a clear narrative of regulatory overreach through congressional 
hearings and a series of research reports, the critics laid the groundwork for the 
Trump Administration’s decision to end OCP in the fall of 2017.135 This termina-
tion, perhaps, was made easier by their ability to write on a mostly blank public 
slate; OCP’s designers had invested little time and effort in building public 
awareness and support for the program.136 
136. The financial press did not cover OCP before the summer of 2013, and mainstream newspapers 
did not follow suit until 2014. Eventual press coverage overwhelmingly stressed Republican complaints. 
See, e.g., Peter Weinstock, Regulators Gang Up on Banks, Third-Party Payment Processors, AM. 
BANKER: BANKTHINK (Aug. 22, 2013, 9:44 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/regulators- 
gang-up-on-banks-third-party-payment-processors [https://perma.cc/E999-GGVP]. 
III. IMPLICATIONS 
The responses to consumer protection problems in the wake of the Global 
Financial Crisis highlighted in our four case studies underscore the complex dy-
namics of crisis-driven regulatory policy, which defy simple theories of policy 
reaction. We offer the following observations.137 
The crisis radiated from an epicenter of residential mortgage finance, a 
dynamic appreciated by key legislators and other policymakers. As such, the 
most vigorous anti-deception policy responses focused on mortgages. This obser-
vation is borne out in statutory reform (creation of the CFPB and mortgage- 
135. See Letter from Stephen E. Boyd, Assistant U.S. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Rep. Bob 
Goodlatte, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary 1 (Aug. 16, 2017) (calling OCP a “misguided 
initiative” and stating that “[w]e share your view that law abiding businesses should not be targeted 
simply for operating in an industry that a particular administration might disfavor”). 
137. For references to parallel analytical points, see POLICY SHOCK, supra note 1, at 540–57. 
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specific prohibitions and requirements in Dodd–Frank), the CFPB’s agenda-set-
ting through rulemaking and other means, and FTC enforcement campaigns such 
as Operation Stolen Dreams. Nonetheless, subsequent actions by regulators dem-
onstrate recognition that deception arises, and requires redress, in a wider array of 
consumer financial markets and circumstances.138 Despite the concentration on 
reforming markets for mortgage origination distribution and enforcement, the 
GFC cast a much wider shadow over anti-deception efforts in the federal govern-
ment. Thus, political appointees at regulatory agencies made fraud monitoring 
and enforcement a bigger priority. They deepened interagency cooperation and 
networks, especially through the work of the FFETF, and were thus more readily 
able to recognize emerging patterns of marketplace deception. As a result, they 
could move relatively quickly to address post-crisis loan modification scams and 
robosigning, which were directly connected to mortgage markets, business op-
portunity, and employment scams, which exploited widespread post-crisis finan-
cial distress, and emerging problems in markets such as student loans, which 
resemble practices prevalent in the pre-crisis mortgage arena. Given sufficient 
discretion and resources, post-crisis regulators had a greater ability to address 
newly discovered problems and prevent regulating only in the rear-view 
mirror.139 
Directly in the aftermath of the GFC, the same congressional leaders and the 
Obama Administration who viewed mortgage finance as rife with bad corporate 
actors associated the GFC with fragmented and ineffective regulatory authority, 
which diffused responsibility and stimulated forum shopping for sympathetic reg-
ulators. At the same time, those policymakers drew the lesson that regulation had 
to pay more attention to consumer protection and systemic risk. Although these 
narratives were not universally endorsed and skeptics continue to criticize them, 
this framing of consumer protection issues encouraged a more vigorous and com-
prehensive policy response, particularly in the CFPB, which was premised on 
institutional consolidation. 
In the face of that strong policy preference for regulatory consolidation, indus-
tries seeking to deflect stringent regulatory oversight were incentivized to empha-
size other priorities of crisis response. For example, the auto dealer carveout 
gained bipartisan political support because it could be seen as supporting the 
domestic automobile industry, which had cratered amid the economic downturn, 
as well as the wider imperative of stabilizing employment and laying the ground-
work for economic recovery. 
138. See Peterson, supra note 6, at 1091–92 (“Deception was by far the most common legal violation 
asserted in CFPB public enforcement actions to date. . . . Cases pleading deception generated . . . about 
93% of all consumer relief awarded in public Bureau actions.”). Anti-deception actions included a 
significant number enforcing the FTC Telemarketing Sales Rule. Id. at 1092 tbl.8. 
139. See Claessens & Kodres, supra note 66, at 436 (“The outcome should be that policy-making 
takes a more ‘Bayesian’ approach where reforms are implemented in areas where knowledge is greater, 
while in other areas both a more ‘experimental’ approach is taken and more resources – data, analyses – 
are invested to clarify the best approach.”). 
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Although the CFPB has ordinarily been cautious in exercising its authority 
(notwithstanding critics’ claims otherwise),140 attention to business fraud and 
heightened appreciation for regulatory discretion prompted other aggressive bu-
reaucratic innovation, most notably Operation Choke Point. That innovation 
sometimes undermined key policy values like procedural protections for regu-
lated entities, a key element in the eventually successful effort to end OCP. 
A further point worth emphasis involves the contested nature of post-crisis pol-
icy autopsies, and their susceptibility to revision with subsequent political out-
comes. However an objective third party might characterize the GFC’s policy 
autopsies along an ideological spectrum, they have become the subject of partisan 
battle, culminating in sharp reversals of policy undertaken by the Trump 
Administration. Republican members of Congress have contested many elements 
of the causal narratives identified above. The most aggressive antifraud policy 
extensions of the post-GFC period, such as Operation Choke Point, have been 
particularly susceptible to critique. 
The GFC presents many other opportunities to investigate patterns of post-cri-
sis regulatory policymaking. Other consumer protection topics to be explored 
through the policy shock lens include home mortgage origination and so-called 
fringe lending products such as payday loans, check cashing, and pawn shops. 
The domain of investor protection in the United States beckons as a terrain to 
explore—not least because policy responses there reflected notably contradictory 
impulses. On the one hand, the Dodd–Frank Act tightened structures of investor 
protection in a host of ways. The legislation greatly expanded the enforcement 
powers available to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), including 
enhanced investigative authority, new incentives for whistleblowers, clarification 
of the SEC’s ability to sanction professionals who abet securities violations, and 
heightened penalties for transgressions of administrative rules.141 Dodd–Frank 
also dramatically extended antifraud authority at the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC), removing the requirement that fraud cases demonstrate 
intentional deception, extending prohibitions against market manipulation, and 
expanding CFTC jurisdiction to include a wider range of derivative financial 
instruments, such as credit default swaps.142 On the other hand, the JOBS Act, 
passed by the same Congress with large bipartisan majorities, reduced disclosure  
140. See Peterson, supra note 6, at 1096 (countering CFPB’s “rogue agency” critiques with evidence 
of its collaboration with other law enforcement “in 9 out of 11 cases with consumer relief awards in 
excess of $100 million”). 
141. See generally MARK JICKLING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41503, THE DODD-FRANK WALL 
STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: TITLE IX, INVESTOR PROTECTION (2010) (outlining 
major changes under Title IX and their background and purpose); Bennett Rawicki, The Dodd-Frank 
Act and SEC Enforcement—The Significant Expansions and Remaining Limitations on the SEC’s 
Enforcement Scope and Arsenal, 41 SEC. REG. L.J. 35 (2013) (analyzing the evolution of securities law 
and enforcement and impact of Dodd–Frank). 
142. See Vasu B. Muthyala & Laura L. Conn, The CFTC’s New Era of Aggressive Enforcement, 13 
CRIM. LITIG. 9, 9–10 (2013). 
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requirements on many new initial public offerings.143 Explaining such cross-cur-
rents will likely require attention to post-crisis policy autopsies, coalition-build-
ing, and construction of political narratives that we offer in this Article, as well as 
the sort of political and policy counterattacks that have constrained the activities 
of the CFPB and, more understandably, brought an end to Operation Choke 
Point. 
The post-GFC period also offers rich possibilities for comparing American 
policy responses to those in other industrialized and industrializing countries. 
How did high-income countries in Europe and Asia, or emerging economies in 
the Global South, make sense of the GFC’s implications for consumer protection, 
investor protection, or other crisis-related issues? To what extent did legislators 
and regulatory officials in these other nations follow the lead of American policy-
makers, or rather, chart different paths on the basis of distinctive assessment of 
local conditions or by questioning American wisdom in the face of a worldwide 
crisis that originated in the United States? How important were policy interme-
diaries such as the Organization for Cooperation and Economic Development in 
diffusing, or forestalling, policy ideas and strategies? Answering such queries 
will depend on a collective effort from social scientists with detailed knowledge 
of relevant languages and societal contexts. But the pay-off from a parallel set of 
investigations would be significant, greatly improving our understanding of more 
general patterns and tendencies in crisis-driven regulatory change. 
CONCLUSION 
Major crises usually generate a large volume of academic commentary as well 
as regulatory reactions. We call for a deeper scholarly enterprise: to operational-
ize the study of crises and the responses that follow them, which inevitably defy 
the predictions of the most elegant theories. Treating the Global Financial Crisis 
as a policy shock, this Article has presented four case studies on topics and using 
methods that have received short-shrift in the literature relative to other GFC 
issues. We offer these studies and commentaries as a template for evaluating the 
next big crisis when it comes, as it inevitably will—whether in the form of finan-
cial meltdown, environmental catastrophe, or other profound societal challenge.  
143. See Michael D. Guttentag, Patching a Hole in the JOBS Act: How and Why to Rewrite the Rules 
that Require Firms to Make Periodic Disclosures, 88 IND. L.J. 151, 169–70 (2013). See generally 
Colleen Honigsberg, Robert J. Jackson, Jr. & Yu-Ting Forester Wong, Mandatory Disclosure and 
Individual Investors: Evidence from the JOBS Act, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 293 (2015). 
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